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Abstract—Current formal approaches have been successfully
used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it
is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their
large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we propose a novel
framework that can automatically verifying security protocols
without any human intervention. Experimental results show that
SmartVerif automatically verifies security protocols that cannot
be automatically verified by existing approaches. The case study
also validates the effectiveness of our dynamic strategy.
Index Terms—Formal verification, Machine learning, Artificial
intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
Security protocols aim at providing secure communications
on insecure networks by applying cryptographic primitives.
However, the design of security protocols is particularly error-
prone. Design flaws have been discovered for instance in the
Google Single Sign On Protocol [1], in commercial security
tokens implementing the PKCS#11 standard [2], and one may
also recall Lowe’s attack [3] on the Needham-Schroeder public
key protocol 17 years after its publication. These findings
have made the verification of security protocols a very active
research area since the 1990s.
During the last 30 years, many research efforts [4]–[12]
were spent on designing techniques to model and analyze pro-
tocols. The earliest protocol analysis tools, e.g., the Interroga-
tor [13] and the NRL Protocol Analyzer [14], could be used to
verify security properties specified in temporal logic. Generic
model checking tools have been used to analyze protocols,
e.g., FDR [3] and later Murphi [15]. More recently the focus
has been on model checking tools developed specifically for
security protocol analysis, such as Blanchet’s ProVerif [5],
the AVISPA tool [4], Maude-NPA [6] and tamarin prover
[7]. There have also been hand proofs aimed at particular
protocols. Delaune et al. [16] showed by a dedicated hand
proof that for analyzing PKCS#11 one may bind the message
size. Similarly, Delaune et al. [17] gave a dedicated result
for analyzing protocols based on the TPM and its registers.
Guttman [18] also manually extended the space model by
adding support for Wang’s fair exchange protocol [19].
Unfortunately, although formal analysis has been successful
in finding design flaws in many security protocols, it is still
challenging for existing verification tools to support fully
automated analysis of security protocols, especially protocols
with global states [20]–[24] or unbounded sessions [25]–
[27]. They may suffer non-termination during the verification
mainly caused by the problem of state explosion. To avoid
the explosion of the state space, several tools, e.g., ProVerif
[5] and AVISPA [4], use an abstraction on protocols, so that
they support more protocols with unbounded sessions. Due to
the abstraction, however, they may report false attacks when
analyzing protocols with global states [23], [28]. StatVerif
[23] and Set-pi [28] extend the applied pi-calculus with global
states, but the number of sessions they support is limited and
they fail to automatically verify complicated protocols (e.g.,
CANauth protocol [29]). GSVerif [30] enrichs ProVerif’s proof
strategy and supports several protocols with unbounded ses-
sions [20], [22], but it fails to automatically verify complicated
protocols (e.g., Yubikey protocol [21]). Tamarin prover [7],
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[31] can verify more protocols without limitations of states
or sessions, but it comes at the price of loosing automation,
for it requires the user to supply insight into the problem by
proving auxiliary lemmata.
We propose and implement SmartVerif, a novel and general
framework of verifying security protocols. It pushes the limit
of automation capability of state-of-the-art verification tools.
Our work is motivated by the observation that these tools
generally use a static strategy during verification, where design
of the strategy is non-trivial. Here, the verification can be
simply regarded as the process of path searching in a tree:
each node represents a proof state which includes a lemma
as a candidate used to prove the lemma in its parent. Due to
the variation of states in searching spaces, the strategy must
be general so that it can correctly choose the node in each
searching step; otherwise it may result in non-termination. It
becomes more challenging when verifying different protocols,
especially protocols with unlimited states and sessions.
Based on the observation, we design a dynamic strategy in
SmartVerif. In other words, SmartVerif runs round-by-round,
where in each round the strategy is either applied in searching
until the complete proof path is selected, or optimized in case
the current selected path is estimated incorrect. The initial-
ization of the strategy does not need any human intervention,
i.e., the initial strategy is purely random. After the strategy is
sufficiently optimized, it can smartly choose the next searching
nodes. Specially, it efficiently localizes the node representing a
supporting lemma among the nodes, which leads to success in
verification. Here, the supporting lemma is a special lemma
necessarily used for proving the specified security property.
Therefore, the supporting lemmata have to be proven, before
the property is verified. Recall that tamarin prover can let
users supply supporting lemmata to reduce the complexity of
automation. In comparison, the dynamic strategy in SmartVerif
can help find the lemmata automatically and smartly, such that
the protocols can be verified without any user interaction.
Our dynamic strategy builds upon the insight that the node
representing a supporting lemma is on the incorrect path
with lower probability, when a random strategy is given (See
the proof in Appendix A). Hence, we introduce Deep Q
Network (DQN) [32], a reinforcement learning agent, into
the verification. The DQN updates the strategy according
to historical incorrect paths. It uses an experience replay
mechanism [33] which randomly samples previous transitions,
and smooths the training distribution over the incorrect paths.
The DQN supports the training of neural networks with
stochastic gradient descent in a stable manner [32]. As a
result, an optimized strategy tends to select a node representing
supporting lemma among the candidates, which leads to higher
probability of successful verification.
We also propose to solve other technical problems in im-
plementing SmartVerif. We present an approach of generating
incomplete verification tree for reducing the memory overhead.
We also design an algorithm of estimating correctness of
selected paths, which is the key component for supporting
the DQN. Note that since we focus on the automation capa-
bility, we design SmartVerif based on tamarin prover that we
modify tamarin prover for preprocessing protocol models and
acquiring information for the DQN.
Experimental results show that SmartVerif can automat-
ically verify all the studied protocols, without any human
intervention. These protocols include Yubikey protocol [21]
and CANauth protocol [29], which cannot be automatically
verified by state-of-the-art verification tools. The case study
also validates the efficiency of our dynamic strategy.
The main contributions of the paper are three folds:
1) We present SmartVerif, to the best of our knowledge,
the first framework that automatically verifies security
protocols by dynamic strategies.
2) We propose several methods to deal with technical prob-
lems in implementing the framework.
3) SmartVerif pushes the limit of automation capability of
protocol verification, and it outperforms state-of-the-art
tools.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review
some related work and introduce tamarin that we use in
Section II and Section III, respectively. Then, we present the
overview of SmartVerif in Section IV. In Section V, we show
an illustrative example of security protocols. Afterwards, we
solve the main problems in designing the Acquisition and Ver-
ification module in Section VI and Section VII, respectively.
We report our extensive experimental results in Section VIII.
Finally, we present our future work and conclude the paper.
We also illustrate and prove our insight in the Appendix A.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several typical model checking approaches that
can deal with security protocols. AVISPA/AVANTSSAR plat-
form [4] is a tool for the automated validation of security pro-
tocols and applications. It provides a modular and expressive
formal language for specifying protocols and their security
properties, and integrates different backends that implement
a variety of automatic analysis techniques. It exhibits a high
level of scope and robustness while achieving performance
and scalability. Moreover, Fro¨schle et al. [34] automatically
analyze APIs of key tokens using SATMC of AVISPA [35],
and show that an API is not robust by finding an attack.
ProVerif [5], one of the most efficient and widely used
protocol analysis tools, relies on an abstraction that encodes
protocols in Horn clauses. This abstraction is well suited for
the monotonic knowledge of an attacker, which makes the tool
efficient for verifying protocols with an unbounded number of
protocol sessions [36]–[38]. It is capable of proving reacha-
bility properties, correspondence assertions, and observational
equivalence. Protocol analysis is considered with respect to
an unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded message
space. StatVerif [23] is an extension of ProVerif with support
for explicit states. Its extension is carefully engineered to
avoid many false attacks. It is used to automatically reason
about protocols that manipulate global states. GSVerif [30]
extends ProVerif to global states. It provides several sound
transformations that cover private channels, cells, counters,
and tables. It is efficient to verify protocols with global
states. However, it still fails to verify several complicated
protocols (e.g., Yubikey [21] and CANauth protocol [29]) with
unbounded sessions. For these protocols, it requires users to
manually design a sequence of proof formulas to prove the
security properties.
Another verification approach that supports the verification
of stateful protocols is the tamarin prover [39], [7]. Instead of
abstraction techniques, it uses backward search and lemmata
to cope with the infinite state spaces in verification. The benefit
of tamarin and related tools is a great amount of flexibility in
formalizing relationships between data that cannot be captured
by a particular abstraction and resolution approach. However
it comes at the price of loosing automation, i.e., the user has to
supply insight into the problem by proving auxiliary lemmata
for complex protocols. Tamarin has already been used for
analyzing the Yubikey device [40], security APIs in PKCS#11
[16] and a protocol in TPM [17]. Moreover, it does not require
bounding the number of keys, security devices, reboots, etc.
As a total, current approaches provide efficient ways in
verifying security protocols. However, they commonly adopt
a static strategy during verification, which may result in non-
termination when verifying complicated security protocols.
Encountering these cases, human experts are needed to analyze
the reason of non-termination and supply hand proof.
At the same time, fast progress has been unfolding in ma-
chine learning applied to tasks that involve logical inference,
such as natural language question answering [41], knowledge
base completion [42] and premise selection in the context of
theorem proving [43]. Reinforcement learning in particular has
proven to be a powerful tool for embedding semantic meaning
and logical relationships into geometric spaces, specifically
via models such as convolutional neural networks, recurrent
neural networks, and tree-recursive neural networks. These
advances strongly suggest that reinforcement learning may
have become mature to yield significant advances in many
research areas, such as automated theorem proving. To the best
of our knowledge, SmartVerif is the first work that applies AI
techniques to the automated verification of security protocols.
III. PRELIMINARIES OF TAMARIN PROVER
We firstly introduce tamarin prover that we modify. The
tamarin prover [7] is a powerful tool for the symbolic modeling
and analysis of security protocols. It takes a security protocol
model as input, specifying the actions taken by agents running
the protocol in different roles (e.g., the protocol initiator,
the responder, and the trusted key server), a specification of
the adversary, and a specification of the protocol’s desired
properties. Tamarin can then be used to automatically construct
a proof that, when many instances of the protocol’s roles
are interleaved in parallel, together with the actions of the
adversary, the protocol fulfills its specified properties.
Protocols and adversaries are specified using an expressive
language based on multiset rewriting rules. These rules define
a labeled transition system whose state consists of a symbolic
representation of the adversary’s knowledge, the messages on
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Fig. 1. Framework of SmartVerif.
the network, information about freshly generated values, and
the protocol’s state. The adversary and the protocol interact by
updating and generating network messages. Security properties
are modeled as trace properties, checked against the traces of
the transition system.
To verify a protocol, tamarin uses a constraint solving
algorithm for determining whether P E φ holds for a
protocol P , a trace property φ and an equational theory E
that formalizes the semantics of function symbols in protocol
model. The algorithm uses constraint solving to perform a
complete search for counter-examples to P E φ, i.e., it
attempts a proof by contradiction. A proof always starts
with either a simplification step, which translates the security
property into an initial constraint system that needs to be
resolved, or an induction step, which generates the necessary
constraints to prove the security property using induction on
the length of the trace. Constraint systems Γ are used to
represent the intermediate states of search. This problem is
undecidable and the algorithm does not always terminate.
Nevertheless, it often finds a counter-example (an attack) or
succeeds in unbounded verification.
On a high level, a constraint solving algorithm consists of
two components: (1) a constraint reduction strategy, which
gives rise to a possibly infinite search tree, and (2) a search
strategy, which is used to search this tree for a solved con-
straint system.
A constraint reduction strategy is a function r from con-
straint systems Γ to a finite set of constraint systems satisfying
the following two conditions. (i) The constraint reduction
relation {(Γ , r(Γ)) | Γ ∈ dom(r)} is well-formed, correct,
and complete. (ii) Every well-formed constraint system not in
the domain of r has a non-empty set of solutions.
Intuitively, tamarin applies constraint reduction rules to a
constraint system to generate a finite set of refined systems.
Note that tamarin prover uses these rules to represent lemmata
in verification process. The rule application process is repeated
until the constraint system is solved. Therefore, tamarin uses
a search tree to store all the constraints systems in the
verification process. Each node of a tree is an independent
constraint system.
To search for a solved constraint system, tamarin prover uses
a heuristic to sort the applicable rules for a constraint system.
The design rationale underlying tamarin’s heuristic is that it
prefers rules that are either trivial to solve or likely to result
in a contradiction. Since the rules are sorted, tamarin always
chooses the first rule to apply to the constraint system. Hence,
the search tree is simplified to a finite one, which reduces the
complexity of verification process.
Tamarin provides two ways of verifying protocols. It has an
efficient automated mode that combines message deduction
and human-designed heuristics to guide proof search. If the
automated proof search terminates, it returns either a proof of
correctness or a counterexample, representing an attack that
violates the stated property. Since the tool may not terminate in
automated mode, tamarin also provides an interactive mode for
users to manually construct a proof and seamlessly combine
it with automated proof search.
IV. OVERVIEW
Briefly, given a protocol description and a security prop-
erty, i.e., the protocol model, the workflow of SmartVerif
consists of the following steps:
• Step 1: The Deep Q Network (DQN) is initialized with a
purely random strategy, which takes multiple candidates
as input, and randomly chooses a candidate with the
uniform probability as output.
• Step 2: SmartVerif conducts proof searching by using the
current strategy. It executes in parallel by multi-threading.
In each thread, a proof path is generated using the tamarin
prover as backend, where each node on the path is chosen
according to the strategy.
• Step 3: If a path generated in Step 2 is correct and
complete, SmartVerif terminates and outputs the path as
the result.
• Step 4: Otherwise, if all the paths generated in Step 2
are estimated incorrect, SmartVerif starts a new epoch
where the DQN is trained according to the proof paths,
and the strategy is updated. Here, we use the term epoch
to denote the time step in which the DQN is optimized
with a new reward.
• Step 5: Go to Step 2.
As shown in Figure 1, SmartVerif contains Acquisition and
Verification module, which execute in multiple rounds:
Acquisition: The module generates a verification tree as
input of Verification module. A path in the tree corresponds
to a possible proof path in verification. Each node in the tree
contains information for guiding the verification. We modify
tamarin prover to collect the information. Since information
of the nodes is transformed as input of the DQN, which is
difficult for handling high dimensional data, the information
must be carefully chosen to reduce complexity of designing
the DQN. Moreover, we face a problem of constructing the
verification tree. There are protocols with large or infinite state
spaces [20], [21]. In this case, even little information stored
in nodes would still lead to memory explosion. To solve the
problem, we design the DQN to guide the tree generation.
Specifically, the tree is generated and expanded gradually that
in each round only one of the endpoint nodes in the current
tree is expanded, and the rest endpoint nodes remain collapsed
for reducing the complexity of the tree. Here, the selection of
the endpoint node is guided by the current strategy in DQN.
Verification: The module selects a path from the verification
tree as a candidate proof. The path selection is guided by the
DQN. Meanwhile, the DQN is also optimized with correctness
of the selection. Here, we additionally illustrate how the
submodules in the Verification module deal with the tree.
Briefly, there are 2 submodules.
1) Correctness Determination: It estimates whether the
DQN selects the correct path. The main idea is to detect
whether there are loops along the path (See Section VII-B). In
each round, SmartVerif works according to the selected path
in different cases:
Case 1: The path is estimated incorrect. We optimize the
DQN in this epoch by passing a reward to the DQN. Mean-
while, we start a new epoch and send feedback to Acquisition
module, where the submodule of Initial Tree Construction is
informed to regenerate a new verification tree. As a result, we
can find a new proof path according to the optimized DQN
afterward.
Case 2: The path is estimated correct but incomplete. The
incompleteness of the path is caused by the incompleteness
of the verification tree. Therefore, we inform the submodule
of Subtree Construction to expand the tree in the next round,
so the path is also extended in the next round for shaping a
complete path.
Case 3: The path is correct and complete. In this case, we
achieve a successful verification of the protocol model, so we
can terminate SmartVerif.
2) Deep Q Network (DQN): The DQN corresponds to the
dynamic strategy for selecting paths and optimizes itself by
training. Given a group of estimated incorrect paths generated
by using the current strategy, the training process works as
follows. First, for each node that is on a path of the group,
the node is bound to a negative reward. The reward is related to
the probability that the node represents a supporting lemma,
according to our insight as mentioned in Section I. In the
implementation, a tuple, which includes the node and the
reward, is added into a global dataset. Then, a subset is
sampled from the dataset. Finally, the parameters of the DQN
is optimized by minimizing a loss function. Here, the loss
function is the sum of sub-functions. Each sub-function takes
an individual tuple in the subset as input, and outputs the
difference between results calculated according to two pre-
defined functions. One of the functions is calculated by using
the parameters of current DQN, and the other is calculated
by using the training parameters of the optimized DQN.
Informally, the training process optimizes the network in order
that the reward of each node can be estimated. In other words,
the node with the highest reward among its siblings can be
regarded as the one with supporting lemma, if the DQN is
sufficiently optimized.
V. EXAMPLE
To illustrate our method, we consider a simple security
protocol. The goal of the protocol is that when a participant C
sends a symmetric key k to another participant S, the secret
symmetric key k should not be obtained by the adversary.
S1. C → S : {′1′, k}pkS
S2. S → C : {′2′, hash(k)}
Fig. 2. A simple security protocol.
The brief process of the protocol is shown in Figure 2.
In step S1, C generates a symmetric key k, encrypts a
tuple {′1′, k} with the public key of S, and sends the encrypted
message. In step S2, S receives C’s message, decrypts it
with its private key, and gets the symmetric key k. Finally,
S confirms the receipt of k by sending back its hash to C.
The communication network is assumed to be completely
controlled by an active Dolev-Yao style adversary [44]. In
particular, the adversary may eavesdrop the public channels or
send forged messages to participants according to the channels.
Moreover, the adversary can access the long-term keys of
compromised agents.
Here, we provide a brief explanation on modeling protocols
in tamarin prover. A tamarin model defines a transition system
whose state is a multiset of facts. The transitions are specified
by rules. At a very high level, tamarin rules encode the behav-
ior of participants and adversaries. Tamarin rules l − [a]→ r
have a left-hand side l (premises), actions a, and a right-
hand side r (conclusions). The left-hand and right-hand sides
of rules respectively contain multisets of facts. Facts can be
consumed (when occurring in premises) and produced (when
occurring in conclusions). Each fact can be either linear or
persistent (marked with an exclamation point !). While we
use linear facts to model limited resources that cannot be
consumed more times than they are produced, persistent facts
are used to model resources which can be consumed any
number of times once they have been produced. Actions are
a special kind of facts. They do not influence the transitions,
but represent specific states in protocol. These states form the
relation between transition system and the security property.
Security properties are specified in a fragment of first-order
logic. Tamarin offers the usual connectives (where & and |
denote and and or, respectively), quantifiers All and Ex, and
timepoint ordering <. In formulas, the prefix # denotes that
the following variable is of type timepoint. The expression
Action(args)@#t denotes that Action(args) is logged at
point t.
For instance, to model the above protocol, we first define
several functions. 1) In(m) and Out(m) function which
represents sending and receiving message m, respectively;
2) aenc{a}k and adec{a}k function which represent the
asymmetric encryption and decryption of a variable a using
key k; 3) Ltk(A, ltk) and Pk(A, pk) function which
represent the participant A is bound to a public key pk and a
private key ltk; 4) fst{a, b} and snd{a, b} function which
get the first and second element from a tuple {a, b}; 5)
Eq(a, b) function which states a is equal to b; 6) h(a)
function which represents hashing a.
rule Client 1 :
[ Fr(k), !Pk(S, pkS) ]→ [ Client 1(S, k), Out(aenc{′1′, k}pkS) ]
rule Client 2 :
[ Client 1(S, k), In(h(k)) ]− [ SessKeyC(S, k) ]→ []
rule Serv 1 :
[ !Ltk(S, ltkS), In(request) ]− [ Eq(fst(adec(request, ltkS)), ′1′) ]
→ [ Out(′2′,h(snd(adec(request, ltkS)))) ]
Fig. 3. The model of the protocol process.
Then, the compromise of private keys is modeled using the
following rule.
rule Reveal ltk :
[ !Ltk(A, ltk) ]− [ LtkReveal(A) ]→ [ Out(ltk) ]
It has a premise !Ltk(A, ltk) which binds the private key
ltk to a participant A. The corresponding conclusion Out(ltk)
represents the private key ltk is sent to the adversary. Note
that, this rule has an LtkReveal(A) action stating that the
key of A was compromised. This action is used to model the
security property.
Then, the protocol is modeled using the rules in Figure 5.
Rule Client 1 captures a participant generating a fresh key
and sending the encrypted message. The rule has two facts for
premises. The first is a Fr(k) fact which states a fresh variable
k is generated. The second is a !Pk(S, pkS) fact which states
the public key pkS is bound to a participant S. In this case, the
second fact is a persistent fact since the public key can be used
in many times (i.e., by protocol participants or adversaries). If
the facts in premises are matched with the facts in the current
state, two conclusions are produced. The first is an action
Client 1(S, k) which states that k is sent to a participant S.
The second conclusion is Out(aenc{′1′, k}pkS). This fact
states the participant uses a public key pkS to encrypt the
message {′1′, k} and send the message by function Out.
Rule Serv 1 captures a participant receiving the message sent
by C and sending the hash value of k back. Rule Client 2
captures a participant receiving the hash value and completing
a run of the protocol.
Finally, we define a security property, which states that
when a participant C sends a symmetric key k to another
participant S , the secret symmetric key k should not be
obtained by the adversary. The security property is modeled
as a lemma Client session key secrecy in Figure 4. The
lemma indicates that, there must not exist a state, where
action SessKeyC(S, k) happens and the adversary K
obtains k, without the happening of the compromise ac-
tion LtkReveal(S).
lemma Client session key secrecy :
′′not( Ex S k #i #j. SessKeyC(S, k) @ #i & K(k) @ #j
& not(Ex #r. LtkReveal(S) @ r) )′′
Fig. 4. The security property.
Note that the above security property of protocol can be
successfully verified by tamarin prover. To better understand
the following sections, we use this protocol as an example. We
describe how we generate the verification tree of the protocol
in Section VI. Then we explain how SmartVerif verifies the
protocol in Section VII.
VI. ACQUISITION MODULE
In Acquisition module, we solve two technical problems
in generating a verification tree. 1) We thoroughly choose
information stored in nodes to reduce the complexity of
designing the DQN. Recall that information of the nodes
is transformed as input of the DQN. Since there is a large
amount of intermediate data in the verification process, it is
hard to design a network which handles high dimensional
data. Hence, the information stored in nodes must be carefully
chosen. 2) We expand the tree according to feedback of
Verification module. The number of the nodes increases during
the expansion, which takes up more memory space. Even
little information in nodes would lead to memory explosion.
To avoid high memory overhead, the constructed tree should
only contain nodes relevant to the current verification round
to reduce the complexity of the tree. Therefore, we guide the
tree generation by using the DQN.
We briefly describe the information we choose to store
in nodes in Section VI-A. Then we present details of tree
construction process in Section VI-B.
A. Choosing Information
The information in nodes of the verification tree is used
in 2 ways. 1) We transform the information to input of the
DQN. In the Verification module, we use the DQN to select a
proof path in verification tree. The DQN in Verification module
requires an input state, which represents current proof state.
We use the information to represent proof state in verification
process. Since it is difficult for the network to handle high-
dimensional data, the input of the network should not be large
in dimensions. Hence, we do not choose all the intermediate
data in the verification process as the information. 2) We
use the information to distinguish different proof states. Note
that SmartVerif runs round-by-round, where in each round
verification trees are constructed and merged. In the merging
process, we compare the information in nodes in different
trees to find a same proof state in each round. Therefore, the
information in the node should not only be simple enough, but
also represent independent state in the verification process.
There is a large amount of data in verification process
of tamarin prover. Recall that the verification process in
tamarin prover is based on constraint systems. Specifically,
a constraint system in tamarin prover contains several parts:
1) step number represents the proof step indicating where
current constraint system is; 2) unsolved goals store all the
unsolved goals in the current system; 3) solved goals store
all the solved goals and assumptions made in the verification
process; 4) dependency graphs consist of the dependencies
of the actions and facts in the unsolved goals; 5) constraint
reduction rules contain all the applicable constraint reduction
rules in current constrain system. Note that tamarin prover
uses term constraint reduction rule to represent lemma that
we explained in Section I.
We choose constraint reduction rules and their correspond-
ing proof step numbers as the information stored in nodes.
Recall that at each proof step tamarin prover applies a con-
straint reduction rule to refine a constraint system. A constraint
reduction rule and its step number indicate a proof state.
Hence, rules and there step numbers can represent independent
states in the verification process. Based on this observation,
we choose these information to store in nodes. Besides, we
modify tamarin prover to collect the information we choose.
The modified tamarin prover takes a protocol model as input.
During verification, it outputs the constraint reduction rules
and corresponding proof step numbers at each proof step. The
information is used to construct the verification tree.
Step 1: rule 1. simplify rule 2. induction
Chosen Rule: simplify
Step 2: rule 1. Client 1(S, k) .o #i rule 2. !KU(h(k))@#vk
Chosen Rule: Client 1(S, k) .o #i
Step 3: rule 1. !KU(∼ k)@#vk.1 rule 2. !KU(h(∼ k))@#vk
...
Fig. 5. An example on information collected from tamarin prover.
Considering the protocol in Section V, we show the infor-
mation collected from modified tamarin prover in Figure 5.
Information in odd numbered lines is the constraint reduction
rules in each proof step, while information in even numbered
lines is the chosen rule by tamarin prover in a verification
process. Specifically, in the first proof step, tamarin prover
constructs the proof starting with either a simplify step,
which translates the security property into an initial constraint
system that needs to be resolved, or an induction step,
which generates the necessary constraints to prove the security
property using induction on the length of the trace. In this
case, tamarin prover chooses rule simplify at proof step #1
to look for a counterexample to the lemma. In detail, it looks
for a protocol execution that contains a SessKeyC(S, k)
and a K(k) action, but does not use an LtkReveal(S).
As shown in Figure 3, action SessKeyC(S, k) is in the
protocol execution only if the protocol step that rule Client 2
captures has happened. Note that rule Client 2 has two
premises Client 1(S, k) and In(h(k)). Hence these two
facts are in the protocol execution. Based on this observa-
tion, tamarin prover has two constraint reduction rules to
select: Client 1(S, k) .o #i and KU(h(k))@#vk. The
first rule Client 1(S, k) .o #i states that the adversary
knows k after action Client 1(S, k) has been executed.
The second rule KU(h(k))@#vk states that the adversary
K knowing k is caused by the adversary knowing its hash
value. According to the protocol model and the cryptographic
functions, tamarin knows that k can not be deduced from its
hash value. Hence, tamarin chooses the first rule. Moreover,
if action Client 1(S, k) is in the protocol execution, the
premises and conclusions in rule Client 1 are also in the
execution. After tamarin applies rule Client 1(S, k) .o #i,
the constraint system is refined by adding the premises and
conclusions of rule Client 1(S, k). Tamarin prover then
Client_session_key
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simplify induction
Client_1( S, 
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Fig. 6. Tree construction.
chooses where adversary K obtains k. It gets two selections
!KU(∼ k)@#vk.1, !KU(h(∼ k))@#vk. The first selection
states that the adversary obtains k from message deduction.
The second is same as the unchosen rule at last proof step.
B. Tree Construction
We construct a verification tree to store the information we
collect. The tree is used in Verification module to generate
a candidate proof by guidance of the DQN. As illustrated
in Figure 1, to avoid memory explosion, we adopt a simple and
effective approach. We firstly construct a tree to store the col-
lected constraint reduction rules. The root node represents the
security property. Each node contains a constraint reduction
rule. Then, in each new round, when the tree is expanded,
an endpoint node in the current tree is chosen according to
the DQN, and a two-depth subtree is generated. The root of
the subtree is the chosen endpoint node and the nodes of the
second depth represent the possible constraint reduction rules
that can be used to prove the lemma of the root. Therefore,
the new tree is formed by merging the subtree into the current
tree.
Taking the protocol in Section V as an example, we
construct a tree using the rules in Figure 5. The root
node represents the lemma Client session key secrecy.
Figure 6 (a) presents the constructed verification tree. In the
new round, the DQN selects the endpoint node which contains
rule Client 1(S, k).o#i from the tree. So we guide modified
tamarin prover to choose it to collect the new rules. Combining
the rules, we construct a new two-depth subtree, i.e., the tree
in Figure 6 (b). Using these rules, we merge the original tree
with the subtree to construct a expanded verification tree. The
merged tree is shown in Figure 6 (c).
Besides, we adopt a multithreading approach to increase the
efficiency of our dynamic strategy. Recall that the DQN opti-
mizes itself with its selection and the corresponding rewards.
Since it makes only one decision at each round, the quantity of
training data is limited, which decreases the training efficiency
and lowers the performance. To solve this problem, we execute
multiple threads of the Acquisition module in parallel to
generate various verification trees for the DQN at a time. Using
this approach, we are able to collect more training data for the
network, which allows for greater data efficiency and increases
the convergence rate.
VII. VERIFICATION MODULE
Briefly, the Verification module selects a proof path from the
verification tree. The selection is guided by the DQN. Then,
we determine the correctness of the selection by the DQN. We
present details of our DQN in Section VII-A. In Section VII-B,
we describe our method of correctness determination.
A. Deep Q Network
In Algorithm 1, the DQN in SmartVerif maintains an action-
selection policy which takes a state st as input, and outputs
an action number at. Here, st represents the proof state, i.e.,
a node in the verification tree, and at is the number of a
chosen child of the node. The state st is a vector transformed
from information in nodes, e.g., the constraint reduction rule.
Note that since the network is optimized by the reward of its
historical selection, it is important that the states of different
nodes in the tree are identical. As shown in Figure 6 (c), the
rule in the tree may be the same, i.e., rule !KU(h(k))@#vk
occurs both at depth 2 and 3.
The DQN runs iteratively with multiple epochs. In each
epoch, recalling that we adopt a multi-threading approach for
increasing the efficiency, the DQN launches σ threads in which
the paths are selected according to the policy (line 5). If a path
is estimated correct and complete, SmartVerif terminates with
the proof path (line 6). If all the selected paths are estimated
incorrect, the policy is optimized (line 7).
In path selection, we use two strategies in the pol-
icy (line 12): 1) an exploration strategy to choose random
actions, which is to explore the values of unchosen ac-
tions; 2) a greedy strategy to choose a which may have the
largest Q value currently. Here, Q(st, a; θe) is a pre-defined
function [32] that outputs comparable value, given the node
st and its ath child. The Q function also takes θe as input,
where θe is the set of the DQN’s parameters at epoch e, and θe
is updated into θe+1 in policy optimization. Combining the
two strategies, we use a -greedy strategy to select actions.
Here,  is a probability value for selecting random actions. We
change the value of  to get different exploration ratios. Note
that we choose random actions in the exploration strategy.
Another possible approach is to take standard heuristic of
tamarin prover as the basic strategy. However, for example,
when verifying Yubikey protocol, the standard heuristic does
not rank the supporting lemma at the first place in several
proof steps. In this case, the DQN does not optimize itself in
an efficient way and the efficiency is worse than SmartVerif.
To apply our insight, we set the reward to the same
negative number for all the edges on each estimated incor-
rect proof path. Specifically, in line 14, a transition, i.e.,
tuple (st, at, ω, st+1), is generated and added to D, where
w is the negative reward for the action at at the state st. D is
a replay memory [33] with capacity N , i.e., in practice, our
network only stores the last N tuples in the replay memory.
In policy optimization, θe in Q function is updated as
mentioned (line 20). Here, n tuples are randomly selected
from D. For each selected tuple (sj , aj , rj , sj+1), we compute
Algorithm 1 Implementation of DQN
1: Initialize a replay memory D to capacity N
2: Initialize an action-value function Q
3: success = 0
4: for e = 1 to EPOCH do
5: Call σ threads that execute path selection
6: if success = 1 then Program ends
7: Execute policy optimization
8:
9: function path selection:
10: Initialize a proof state s1
11: for t = 1 to ROUND do
12: With probability  select a random action at
otherwise select at = maxaQ(st, a; θe)
13: Generate next state st+1 according to at
14: Store a transition (st, at, ω, st+1) in D
15: if the path is estimated incorrect then break
16: if the path is estimated correct and complete then
17: success = 1
18: return
19:
20: function policy optimization:
21: Sample n random transitions (sj , aj , rj , sj+1) from D
22: Set yj = rj + γmaxa′Q(sj+1, a′; θe)
23: Perform a gradient descent step on (yj −Q(sj , aj ; θe+1))2
yi according to θe. Then θe+1 is estimated by using the loss
function (yi −Q(s, a, θe+1))2.
The advantage of applying DQN is that DQN can update our
dynamic strategy efficiently if the reward in DQN is designed
effectively. In other words, sufficient transitions are required to
be updated in D, and the reward in each transition should be
correct. A naive algorithm is to execute line 14 only when the
path estimated incorrect, i.e., only the reward corresponding to
the last node on the incorrect path is set negative. However, the
number of updated transitions is limited. Instead, we improve
the efficiency by storing multiple transitions according to
our insight, and the correctness of the insight is proved in
Appendix A. As illustrated in Section VIII, our experiments
results (e.g., the quantities of training epochs) also validates
the efficiency of SmartVerif.
B. Correctness Determination
We illustrate how we determine the correctness of a selected
path (line 15, Algorithm 1). The main idea is to detect whether
there are loops along the path. For example, Figure 7 shows
the information of the last 5 consecutive nodes on a selected
path, when using tamarin and encountering the loop on the
path. Here, words in blue indicate constraint reduction rules
selected by tamarin prover, and words in black indicate tags
marked by tamarin prover in verification. We find that the rules
of the nodes are similar, which has the following form:
!KU(aenc(<′ 2′, ni.1, nr.1, $R.1 >, pk( ltkA.1))) @ #vk.1)
Therefore, we consider the path incorrect since the loop on
it results in a non-termination in searching. Besides, there are
several other kinds of loops. For example, the sequence of the
nodes may have the form [. . . , a, b, a, b] or [. . . , a, b, c, a, b, c],
where a, b, c are constraint reduction rules. The loops on
these sequences may also lead to a failed verification. Hence,
Fig. 7. An example of verification loop.
the loop detection algorithm should be carefully designed to
determine the correctness of the path.
Based on the observation, we design the algorithm of loop
detection as shown in Algorithm 2. The algorithm takes
a string sequence [s1, s2, ..., sk] as input. The sequence is
transformed from the selected path (line 15, Algorithm 1).
Each element, e.g., si, is the constraint reduction rule of
the corresponding node, i.e., the ith node, on the path. The
algorithm runs iteratively by generating a sequence S (line 4),
and counting the number of pairs of similar elements that
are both in S. If the number is not less than δ, a loop is
detected. For example, given the aforementioned sequence
[. . . , a, b, c, a, b, c], S = (c, c, . . . ), when j = 3. Note that
the length of S is restricted to the limit of ρ for efficiency.
For the same reason, the algorithm is activated only when the
length of the selected path reaches α (line 1).
We use levenshtein distance to measure the similarity be-
tween two rules (line 8 to 13). The distance between two
strings x and y is the minimum number of single-character
edits (insertions, deletions or substitutions) required to change
x into y. If the distance between x and y is less than β of
the length of x, we assume these two strings are similar. For
example in Figure 7, the difference points among the similar
rules are often the numbers at corresponding positions, e.g.,
ni.1, ni.2, ni.3. Informally, the number of difference points
are counted as the distance.
Note that there is not necessarily a loop on every incorrect
path. In other words, if a loop is found given a selected path,
there may be multiple incorrect nodes, i.e., the nodes that do
not represent supporting lemmata, on the path. Therefore, it
is not sufficient to use naive search algorithms, e.g., DFS, to
locate proof paths. We make further studies on analyzing the
effectiveness of the algorithms in Section VIII. Finally, in our
implementation, we set α to 20, β to 0.1, ρ to 20 and δ to 3.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS & EVALUATION
We perform experiments on several security protocols.
The experiment results are described in Section VIII-A. In
Section VIII-B, we briefly overview Yubikey protocol to
validate the efficiency of SmartVerif. All files of our prototype
Algorithm 2 Loop Detection Algorithm
Require: (s1, s2, ..., sk)
1: if k ≥ α then
2: for j = 1 to k − 1 do
3: count = 0
4: S = (sk, sk−j , sk−2j , ...) //|S| ≤ ρ
5: for each element x in S do
6: for each element y in S do
7: if x 6= y then
8: n = length of x, m = length of y
9: for a = 1 to n do
10: for b = 1 to m do
11: if y[a] == x[b] then cost = 0 else cost = 1
12: v[b] = min (v[b− 1] + 1, b, b− 2 + cost)
13: if v[m]/m < β then count = count+ 1
14: if count ≥ δ then return TRUE
15: return FALSE
16: else return FALSE
implementation and protocol models used in benchmark are
available at here [45].
A. Main Experiments
We compare SmartVerif with other verification tools in
verifying security protocols. We evaluate the efficiency of
SmartVerif.
Experiment Setup: Experiments are carried out on a server
with Intel Broadwell E5-2660V4 2.0GHz CPU, 128GB mem-
ory and four GTX 1080 Ti graphic cards running Ubuntu 16.04
LTS. We use and modify tamarin prover v1.4.0 in SmartVerif.
We use the same network architecture, learning algorithm
and parameter settings across all chosen protocols. Since the
security property varies greatly in protocols, we set all the
negative rewards to -10. In these experiments, we use the
DQN with 0.01 learning rate and memory batch of size 7000.
Moreover, we execute eight threads of Acquisition module
in parallel. The behavior policy during training was -greedy
with  annealed linearly from 0.99 to 0.1 over the first hundred
epochs, and fixed at 0.1 thereafter.
Chosen Tools: For each protocol with unbounded ses-
sions, we inspect whether it can be automatically verified by
SmartVerif and other verification tools. These verification tools
include StatVerif [23], Set-pi [28], tamarin prover [7], [31] and
GSVerif [30]. The tools are typical verification tools which
support verification of security protocols with global states.
Moreover, all these tools both provide automated verification
modes to verify security protocols. Besides, we attempt to
verify protocols in four altered versions of tamarin prover.
We first attempt to use the ‘c’ heuristic of tamarin prover.
This heuristic adopts a simplest method to verify protocols:
it solves goals in the order they occur in the constraint
system. Unlike other default static strategies, this method
does not contain any human-designed heuristics or expertise.
We compare SmartVerif with this mode of tamarin prover
to demonstrate the generality of our framework. Then, we
try to verify protocols using the dedicated heuristic (i.e., the
‘p’ heuristic), which is designed by the SAPIC authors [31]
to efficiently solve SAPIC generated Tamarin models. Since
we use tamarin protocol models as well as SAPIC generated
models in our experiment, we additionally compare SmartVerif
with this heuristic to validate the efficiency of our framework.
Moreover, we implement two naive algorithms (DFS and BFS)
with our loop detection method and compare these two with
our algorithm to show the efficiency of SmartVerif. Note that
we do not choose classical verification tools, i.e., ProVerif and
AVISPA, since their support for protocols with global states
and unbounded sessions is limited.
Chosen Protocols: We carefully choose security protocols
to be testified in our evaluation. The chosen protocols include
a simple security API similar to PKCS#11 [20], the Yubikey
security token [21] , the optimistic contract signing protocol by
Garay, Jakobsson and MacKenzie (GJM) [22], TPM-envelope
protocol [17], CANauth protocol [29], etc. We choose these
protocols because they are typical protocols with global states
and unbounded sessions, and many research efforts [7], [23],
[28], [31] were spent on verification of these protocols. Hence,
the experimental results for the protocols are more persuasive.
We also perform detailed analysis on performance of analyzing
the protocols to validate the efficiency of SmartVerif. Note that
we do not choose protocols which are specifically verified in
one tool, which can not be used to compare with other tools,
e.g., protocols with properties of observational equivalence
[48]–[50].
Comparative Results: The experimental results are sum-
marized in Table I. Compared with these verification tools,
SmartVerif is sufficient for generality and automation capabil-
ity: it is able to verify all the given protocols with unbounded
sessions, without any human intervention.
1) Generality. SmartVerif achieves a 100 percent success
rate in verifying the studied protocols, which outperforms all
the other verification tools. For example, StatVerif does not
terminate and the verification fails encountering complicated
protocols like security API in PKCS #11 and mobile EMV
protocol [46]. Set-pi fails in verifying TPM-envelope protocol
[17] and some others with unbounded sessions. GSVerif out-
performs the previous tools in generality but it still can not
automatically verify complicated protocols such as Yubikey
protocol. Tamarin prover is effective in automatically verifying
simple protocols with unbounded sessions, e.g., GJM Contract-
Signing protocol and Security API in PKCS#11. Nevertheless,
it does not achieve automated verification of Yubikey protocol
and Mo¨dersheim’s example, TPM-bitlocker, etc., in any of the
studied versions.
2) Automation capability. Currently, only SmartVerif can
fully automatically verify Yubikey and CANauth protocol [29].
For protocols which existing tools cannot automatically verify,
GSVerif and tamarin prover provide an interactive mode for
users to manually guide the verification. In our experiments,
we find that Yubikey and CANauth protocol can be verified
by manually designing proof formulas using these tools. In
contrast, SmartVerif fully automatically verifies these proto-
cols, without any human intervention. In Section VIII-B, we
briefly overview Yubikey protocol to demonstrate SmartVerif’s
sufficiency in automation capability.
Efficiency and Overhead: To evaluate the efficiency and
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON SECURITY PROTOCOLS WITH UNBOUNDED SESSIONS IN VERIFICATION TOOLS.
Protocols StatVerif Set-pi GSVerif
SAPIC/Tamarin Prover SmartVerif
v1.4.0
(‘s’ heuristic)
‘c’
heuristic
‘p’
heuristic
DFS BFS Automated
Verification?
Training
Epochs Coverage
Training Time (min) Verification
Time (min)Coverage Total Coverage Total Acquisition Network OverallTime Time Training
Yubikey [21] × × × × × × N/A × N/A × X 81 9253 41 39 80 4
Mo¨dersheim’s Example [24] × 7s 6s × × 6m 4424 3h 31037 7h X 20 3064 10 8 18 2
Security API in PKCS#11 [20] × × 15s 25m 7h 18m N/A × N/A × X 164 11647 47 51 98 13
GJM Contract-Signing [22] 10s × 7s 3m 1h 2m 6088 2h 33672 5h X 14 2643 8 9 17 2
one-dec [30] × × 9s × × × 127982 14h N/A × X 30 3985 12 15 27 2
one-dec, table variant [30] × × 8s 4m 1h 3m 55902 8h 155378 14h X 28 3324 13 14 27 2
private-channel [30] × × 7s 3m 50m 3m 3224 3h 34683 5h X 24 2834 10 11 21 2
counter [30] × × 9s 3m 45m 3m 4416 3h 32537 6h X 27 2967 11 11 22 2
voting [30] × × 7s 5m 41m 4m 156673 17h N/A × X 33 5464 18 17 35 3
TPM-envelope [17] × × 8s × × × 36499 11h 206589 20h X 31 4067 14 15 29 2
TPM-bitlocker [17] 5s 6s 8s × × × 4431 3h 33248 6h X 33 3075 11 10 21 2
TPM-toy [17] × × 6s × × × 4865 3h 23502 6h X 20 2521 7 8 15 2
Key registration [28] 4s 6s 7s 2m 30m 3m 4048 2h 43322 6h X 16 3087 7 7 14 3
Secure device [23] × 6s 7s × × 3m 86719 13h N/A × X 35 3991 10 12 22 1
CANauth [29] × × × × × × 6391 7h N/A × X 31 3391 9 11 20 2
CANauth simplified [29] × × × × × × 4344 4h N/A × X 39 3301 9 10 19 2
Mobile EMV [46] × × 6s × × × 239970 17h N/A × X 36 6013 21 23 44 1
Scytl Voting System [47] × × 5s 4m 47m 4m 276673 21h N/A × X 41 7027 29 31 60 2
× no automatic verification (computation time >24h, memory used >128GB) Xautomatic verification
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Fig. 8. Experimental results. (a): Quantity of covered nodes compared with naive algorithms. (b): Total time compared with naive algorithms. (c): Overall
training time using different number of graphic cards. (d): Overall training time using different multithreading parameters.
overhead of SmartVerif, we collect statistics of the running
time and training epochs in verification. The running time
contains two parts: 1) Training time: the time spent in infor-
mation acquisition and network training; 2) Verification time:
the time spent in verification after network convergence. As
presented in this paper, SmartVerif is a novel and general
framework to verify protocols. For each protocol to be verified,
it takes time to acquire information and train the network.
Once the DQN is sufficiently optimized according to the
current protocol model, it can be directly used to verify the
corresponding protocol, like the static strategies in existing
tools. Hence, we use the verification time to demonstrate the
performance of SmartVerif. Besides, since SmartVerif uses
the DQN to select proof paths, the efficiency of the DQN
directly affects the performance and overhead of SmartVerif.
Recall that the number of epochs denotes the times that the
DQN is optimized with a new reward, which is related to the
number of generated incorrect paths, if the protocol has not
been successfully verified. Therefore, we use the quantities of
training epochs and time of DQN to evaluate the efficiency of
our framework.
As demonstrated in Table I, the experimental results show
that SmartVerif verifies the studied protocols in a very efficient
way. For most protocols, it succeeds in verification only after
about 25 times of one-way forward traversing (i.e., 25 epochs).
As the challenge is time explosion when traversing infinite
state spaces, our dynamic strategy solves the problem in a gen-
eral and adequate way. For instance, existing verification tools
can not automatically verify Yubikey protocol with unbounded
sessions due to memory explosion or infinite verification loops.
In contrast, SmartVerif only takes 81 epochs to find the correct
proof path using the dynamic strategy.
Moreover, the statistics of the running time also validate the
efficiency of SmartVerif. Comparing to existing verification
tools, SmartVerif does not require any extra time and effort in
training human for interactive proving or designing heuristics.
Instead, it spends the training time on optimizing the dynamic
strategy for protocols, which is sufficient. More specifically,
it only takes less than half an hour to find the correct proof
path for most protocols. Even in the worst case, it costs 98
minutes to verify the security API in PKCS #11. After the
DQN is sufficiently optimized, the verification time is only 13
minutes.
Performance Analysis: Besides proving our insight the-
oretically, we also perform empirical analysis by comparing
SmartVerif with two naive algorithms: 1) DFS. The algorithm
searches along a path as long as possible before backtrack-
ing. The backtracking occurs only when a loop is detected
according to Algorithm 2. 2) BFS. The algorithm searches
all the paths at the present depth prior to searching at the
next depth level. It also uses the loop detection algorithm to
shrink the size of searching space. The BFS is optimized by
multi-threading that each threads searches in parallel. Note
that DFS is running in a single thread since the ordering and
parallel tends to conflict in searching. Both DFS and BFS are
implemented based on tamarin prover.
The experimental results are shown in Table I and Figure 8
(a, b). We use two metrics: 1) the total time in searching; 2)
coverage, i.e., the quantity of nodes that have been traversed
when the searching succeeds, given the proof steps of verifying
a security protocol. Here, for SmartVerif, the coverage metric
includes the nodes traversed during the Acquisition and Veri-
fication phases. Before comparison, an important observation
is that it takes several seconds for a single step of new node
traversing by using tamarin prover. It may take less time if
using other tools, e.g., the ProVerif-based tools. We also find
that it takes more time when a) traversing a new node at the
deeper level of tree, and b) initializing or reconfiguring the
searching environment. For example, on verifying YubiKey
protocol, the averaging time on traversing a node at level 10
and 100 is 1s and 2s, respectively, and the time on initialization
is 4s. Therefore, the verification time of DFS and BFS tends
to be affected by reason a) and b), respectively. Since the
verification time may be affected by multiple factors, we also
use the number of traversed nodes as a complement metric in
comparison.
A significant result is that DFS’s coverage grows much
faster than SmartVerif’s coverage, when the proof steps in-
crease starting from 65. Afterwards, the verification time of
DFS reaches 24-hour limit when the proof steps are around
160. We further find that for most protocols with proof steps
less than 60, DFS only needs to backtrack for less than 10
steps. For instance, for the TPM-toy protocol, DFS begins
backtracking when it reaches the node at the depth 57, for the
corresponding path is estimated incorrect. When succeeding
in searching, the top 49 nodes in the incorrect path are the
correct nodes representing supporting lemmata. Hence, when
the depth for which DFS has to backtrack merely grows to
more than 10, the performance of DFS starts to decrease
drastically.
Therefore, SmartVerif greatly outperforms DFS when ver-
ifying complicated protocols. The phenomenon can be ex-
plained by our insight informally as follows. When apply-
ing DFS, if an incorrect path is found, the algorithm starts
backtracking along the incorrect path successively. However,
in this case, according to our insight, the probability that a
node on the path represents the supporting lemma decreases.
It can be inferred that the probability that multiple nodes on the
path represent the supporting lemma decreases exponentially.
On the other hand, on finding an incorrect path, SmartVerif
optimizes its searching strategy, and generates a new path with
the highest estimated probability, by introducing the insight
into DQN. Finally, SmartVerif’s coverage grows much slowly
when the proof steps increase. Observe that the performance
of BFS is even worse than the performance of DFS, though
BFS runs in parallel. We omit the explanation due limitation
of paper size.
In addition, we study the performance of training when
using different number of graphic cards. We try three sets
of parameters. Here, µ1, µ2, µ3 represents 0, 2, 4 GTX 1080
Ti graphic cards respectively. As shown in Figure 8 (c), we
can see an improvement to the overall training times when
using more graphic cards in our experiment. For example, it
only takes 80 minutes to verify the Yubikey protocol using
four graphic cards. Using no graphic cards, which means
SmartVerif uses the integrated GPU in the CPU to compute
in the training process, it takes 183 minutes to achieve a
successful verification.
Furthermore, we evaluate the overall training times in
verifying four protocols with different multithreading param-
eters. We try three sets of parameters. σ1, σ2, σ3 represents
2, 4, 8 threads of Acquisition module executed in parallel
respectively. As shown in Figure 8 (d), the running time is
decreasing with the increasing quantity of threads executed
in parallel for the parameters sets σ1, σ2 and σ3. As shown
in the above experimental results, SmartVerif achieve a solid
performance on a high-performance server as well as a modest
machine with less graphic cards.
Note that we currently train a standalone DQN for each
studied protocol to keep a high level of generality. Another
possible approach is to use pre-trained and optimized networks
to verify protocols. However, it brings several challenges.
Firstly, it is challenging to achieve a high level of accuracy
on node selection in generating pre-trained network. Existing
works generating pre-trained networks [51]–[54] in a similar
research field, i.e., theorem proving, do not achieve a high
level of accuracy on node selection. Compared with theorem
proving, it is much challenging to generate pre-trained network
with much higher accuracy, given much less samples of models
of security protocols. Secondly, it is challenging to achieve
high efficiency if using a generated pre-trained network. If
using a pre-trained network, the verification time for some pro-
tocols may increase. For example, one could take the standard
heuristic of tamarin prover as the basic strategy in our DQN
to verify security protocols. However, in this case, the DQN
does not optimize itself in an efficient way when verifying
complicated protocols like Yubikey protocol. Therefore, we
train a standalone DQN for each studied protocol. Similarly
we currently retrain the DQN when verifying a new security
property of a protocol. We will try to optimize the network
design and use other learning techniques in future work.
B. Case Study
In the following, we briefly overview the Yubikey protocol
SmartVerif verified. We provide some details in key steps of
the verification. For the limitation of paper size, we do not
detail all the formal models of the protocols and properties
that we studied.
The Yubikey [21] is a small hardware device designed
to authenticate a user against network-based services. In its
typical configuration, it generates one-time passwords based
on encryption of a secret value, a running counter and some
random values using a unique AES-128 key contained in the
device. The Yubikey authentication server accepts a one-time
password only if it decrypts under the correct AES key to a
valid secret value containing a counter larger than the last
counter accepted. The counter is thus used as a means to
prevent replay attacks.
Kremer et al. [31] modeled and verified Yubikey protocol
with unbounded sessions in tamarin prover. Specifically they
define three security properties. All properties follow more
or less directly from a stronger invariant. By default, tamarin
prover cannot automatically prove this invariant, which is
caused by a non-termination problem. To successfully verify
the protocol, tamarin needs additional human guidance, which
is provided by experts in the interactive mode.
In the following, we analyze the choice made by tamarin
prover, experts and SmartVerif. Specifically, in proof step #8,
tamarin prover needs to select one rule, i.e., lemma, from the
rules as follows:
A : (#vr.13 < #t2.1) ‖ (#vr.13 = #t2.1) ‖ (#vr.6 < #vr.13))
B : State 011111111111(lock11.1, n, n.1, nonce.1, npr.1, otc.1,
secretid, tc2, tuple) .o #t2)
C : Insert(<′ Server′, n >,< n.2, n.1, otc >)@#t2.1)
D :!KU(n)@#vk.2)
E :!KU(senc(< n.2, (otc+ z), npr >, n.1))@#vk.5)
Here, rule A is a restriction rule to the timepoints vr.13, t2.1
and vr.6. Rule B states an action State 011111111111 must
have been in the protocol execution in timepoint t2. Rule C
states an action Insert(<′ Server′, n >,< n.2, n.1, otc >)
must have been in the protocol execution in timepoint t2.1.
Rule D states the adversary has known the nonce n in
timepoint vk.2. Rule E states the adversary has known the
encrypted message senc(< n.2, (otc + z), npr >, n.1) in
timepoint vk.5.
Tamarin prover considers that rule A is a timepoint
constraint rule, which is more likely to achieve a successful
verification. It chooses the rule in the automated mode.
Then, there are four rules B,C,D,E to be chosen.
By default, tamarin chooses the rule A. However,
the rule leads to a loop in verification as follows:
State 011111111111(lock11.1, n, n.1, nonce.1, npr.1, otc.1, secretid, tc2, tuple) .o #t2
...
Insert(<′ Server′, n >,< n.2, n.1, otc >)@#t2.1)
State 0111111111111(lock11.2, n, n.1, nonce.2, npr.2, otc.2, n.2, otc, tuple) .o #t2.1
...
Insert(<′ Server′, n >,< n.2, n.1, otc.1 >)@#t2.2)
State 0111111111111(lock11.3, n, n.1, nonce.3, npr.3, otc.2, n.2, otc.1, tuple) .o #t2.2
In this loop, tamarin prover keeps solving
Insert(<′ Server′, n >,< n.2, n.1, otc >)@#t2.1)
and State 0111111111111(lock11.2, n, n.1, nonce.2, npr.2,
otc.2, n.2, otc, tuple) .o #t2.1 rules alternately. It leads to
non-termination in verification.
In interactive mode, experts make 23 manual rule selections
to verify the protocol, and 11 of them are different from the
one made by tamarin prover. Specifically, experts choose rule
B as the supporting lemma at proof step #8, which leads to a
successful verification.
In SmartVerif, we achieve a fully automated verification of
Yubikey protocol without any user interaction. Figure 9 (a)
shows the corresponding part of the verification tree. The Q
value of each rule in proof step #8 is shown in Table II.
In the initial epoch, the Q value of each rule is the same.
In epoch 20, the network learns from its experience that
...
A B DC E
B ...... ...
Step #7
Step #8
Step #9
Fig. 9. Part of the verification tree in Yubikey protocol
TABLE II
Q VALUE OF EACH RULE IN PROOF STEP #8.
rule A rule B rule C rule D rule E
initial epoch 0 0 0 0 0
epoch 20 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3
epoch 40 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
epoch 81 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.0
epoch 120 1.2 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.1
candidate rules A,C,D,E may lead to non-termination cases
with higher probability. Hence, the Q values of these rules
have a slighter difference compared with Q value of rule B.
Then, the difference between Q value of rule B and the Q
value of other rules is getting larger in further epochs, which
also validate our insight and the effectiveness of our designed
strategy. In epoch 81, SmartVerif finds a correct proof path
when choosing rule B. In further epochs, the difference among
Q value of each rule is getting larger. Based on the Q values,
SmartVerif finds the supporting lemma B automatically, such
that the protocol can be verified without any user interaction.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Our work opens several directions for future work. 1) Hy-
brid strategy. Since the initial strategy in SmartVerif is purely
random, the strategy may be optimized with less epochs if it is
implemented with some static strategy. However, the problem
is still challenging that there is a potential risk that the epochs
may become larger for some special protocols that the static
strategy does not support. 2) Scalability. It is possible that our
dynamic strategy can be used to cope with more complicated
problems, such as automated formal verification of software
or systems [55], [56] that are based on first-order logics [57],
[58] or higher-order logics [59], [60]. They are quite similar
that they can be translated into a path searching problem.
We will also explore and verify more complicated security
protocols using SmartVerif. 3) Efficiency. Currently, we train a
standalone DQN for each studied protocol to keep a high level
of generality. Designing a universal network which can verify
all the protocols may increase the efficiency and improve the
performance of SmartVerif. Therefore, we will try to optimize
the network design and use other AI techniques in future work.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied automated verification of
security protocols. We propose a general and dynamic strategy
to verify protocols. Moreover, we implement our strategy in
SmartVerif, by introducing a reinforcement learning algorithm.
As demonstrated through experiment results, SmartVerif auto-
matically verifies security protocols that is beyond the limit
of existing approaches. The case study also validates the
efficiency of our dynamic strategy.
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APPENDIX
We prove our insight of the paper that the node representing
a supporting lemma is on the incorrect path with lower
probability, when a random strategy is given. To illustrate our
insight more comprehensively, we translate the complicated
verification process into a path searching problem. Here, the
verification can be simply regarded as the process of path
searching in a tree: each node represents a proof state which
includes a lemma as a candidate used to prove the lemma in its
father. The supporting lemma is a special lemma necessarily
used for proving the specified security property.
Formally, suppose there are R correct and complete proof
paths in a given tree, denoted as [nt1 , nt2 , ..., ntkt ], where nti
is the ith proof state at the tth path. Therefore, the lemmata
in {nti} are the candidate lemmata. The random strategy
here means that whenever choosing a child for searching,
the probability of choosing is uniform. In other words, the
probability of choosing the child nti is
1
xti
. If nti has x
children, and y of them represent supporting lemma, and
the random strategy is applied in choosing child, then the
probability of choosing a nodes representing supporting lemma
is yx . Suppose there are at least one child of nti that does not
represent supporting lemma, i.e., x > y.
Theorem 1. Given the above assumptions, after nti has been
chosen, the node representing a supporting lemma, who is the
child of nti , is on an incorrect path with the probability less
than yx .
Proof. For the rth path, define αr as follows:
αr =
{∏kr
j=i+1
1
xrj
if ∀j ∈ [1, i].nrj = ntj
0 otherwise
Denote p1 as the probability that a selected path is incorrect.
p1 = 1−
R∑
r=1
αr
Denote m1,m2, . . . ,my as the nodes representing support-
ing lemmata among the children of nti . For the rth path, define
βr,s as follows:
βr,s =
{∏kr
j=i+2
1
xrj
if nri+1 = ms ∧ ∀j ∈ [1, i].nrj = ntj
0 otherwise
It can be inferred that
αr =
y∑
j=1
1
x
βr,j
Denote p2 as the probability that a selected path is incorrect
and the child representing supporting lemma is on the path.
p2 =
y∑
j=1
1
x
(1−
R∑
r=1
βr,j)
Therefore, denote p as the probability that a child representing
supporting lemma is on an incorrect path.
p =
p2
p1
=
∑y
j=1
1
x (1−
∑R
r=1 βr,j)
1−∑Rr=1∑yj=1 1xβr,j =
y −∑Rr=1∑yj=1 βr,j
x−∑Rr=1∑yj=1 βr,j < yx
As a result, given a random strategy, the probability that
ni is on an incorrect path is less than the probability that
ni is on a given path. In other words, if an incorrect path
is found, the probability that ni is on the path, which equals∏i
j=1
1
xj
on a given path, decreases. On the other hand, the
DQN requires a reward for guiding the optimization, where a
reward corresponds to a determined occurrence of an event,
e.g., a dead-or-alive signal upon an action in a game [32].
However, there is no such determined event in verifications.
Instead, in SmartVerif, we leverage probability of occurrence
that the node representing a supporting lemma is on incorrect
paths for constructing the reward according to Theorem 1. This
insight enables us to leverage the detected incorrect paths to
guide the path selection, which is implemented by using the
DQN.
